The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer holding Title VII “does not permit third party retaliation claims.” An en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia reiterated the basis for an expansive interpretation of the anti-retaliation provisions relying in substantial part upon the text of Title VII's retaliation provision.
"[W]e adopted a broad standard in Burlington because Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is worded broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and a preference for clear rules [the employer's argument] cannot justify departing from statutory text."But Justice Scalia rejects the concept that anyone with Article III standing should be permitted to sue for a Title VII violation. He adopts the "zone of interests" test.
"[A] plaintiff may not sue unless he “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990). We have described the “zone of interests” test as denying a right of review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or in consistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 399–400 (1987). We hold that the term “ag grieved” in Title VII incorporates this test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes,” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 495 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), while excluding plain tiffs who might technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory prohibitions in Title VII."
Posts
